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979

hopes exist, they may lead to falsehood. Spiritual hopes can lead
to nothing but truth.39
Not only do some writers disagree with this approach,4" but all
courts have not been in accord. 4' Both the majority and the dissent in Davis contributed to the deterioration of this concept of
trustworthiness. Although the majority held the above principle
binding in Davis, they recognized that a confession arising from
religious influence, whether prompted by a layman or a clergyman,
may be subject to exclusion.' Though dealing with the prayer only
secondarily (sensing in it a diversion), the dissent implied that such
action by police has no place in an accusatorial system and that the
"psuedo [sic] religious ministrations of a policeman" when a minis
ter is readily available clearly cannot withstand the objective test. 4
The Supreme Court has never been faced with the issue. But use of
religious adjurations to induce a confession would be hard pressed in
withstanding the objective test as applied by the Court.
RALPH MALLOY McKEITHEN

Evidence--Expert Medical Testimony on Causation
In Lockwood v. McCaskill' the North Carolina Supreme Court
seemingly added another dimension to the could-or-might rule of
admissibility of expert testimony as established in Summerlin v.
Carolina & Northwestern R.R. ' It has been an accepted rule in
"Joy, CONFESSIONS 51-52 (1842).
"Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIo ST. L.J.
55 (1963); Note, 1 WASHBURN L. REv. 415 (1961). The latter is the most
complete analysis available regarding the clergyman and coerced confessions.
Cf. REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS (1959).
'E.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Denmark v. State, 95 Fla. 757, 116 So. 757 (1928); Johnson v. State, 107
Miss. 196, 65 So. 218 (1914). Forty-four of the states now have a statute
making privileged any communications between a member of the clergy
and a confessant. These statutes are collected in Professor Reese's article.
Reese, supra note 40, at 61 n.22.
339 F.2d at 776.
339 F.2d at 784-85.
'262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
133 N.C. 550, 45 S.E. 898 (1903).
It would be competent for a physician or surgeon, who is properly
qualified to give an opinion, to state that an injury might have been
caused by a fall from a car, or that such a fall, in other words, could
have produced it; but when he is called upon to say that the injury
was caused by the fall from a car, and not by a fall from any other
elevated place, or in any other way that might just as well have pro-
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this state that it is the safer practice when an expert is to testify
as to cause and effect that he must testify that in his opinion the
occurrence could or might have caused the injury or death, and not
that it did cause, or was the cause of the injury.3 The rationale is
that positive opinion testimony on the issue of causation is an
opinion as to the ultimate fact upon which the jury must decide and
is an invasion of the province of the jury.4
duced the same result, it is beyond his competency as an expert to speak
upon the subject, for he will then be deciding a fact and not merely
giving an expert opinion founded upon a given state of facts.
Id. at 555-56, 45 S.E. at 900. A careful reading of this case would seem
to indicate that it does not establish the could-or-might rule as firmly as
later cases seem to indicate.
'In STANSBURY, NORTn CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 137 (2d ed. 1963)
[hereinafter cited as STANSBURY], the author says:
If the opinion asked for is one relating to cause and effect, the witness
should be asked whether in his opinion a particular event or condition
could or might have produced the result in question, not whether it did
produce such a result. A question in the latter form has been thought
to be objectionable as invading the province of the jury, although the
real objection would seem to be that it unwarrantedly excludes the
possibility of some other cause not referred to in the hypothetical statement. In any event the rule is a technical one, and in several cases the
Court has avoided its application by drawing narrow distinctions or
by finding that error in admission was harmless, but a rigid observance
is the only safe course for counsel to follow.
Id. at 332-33. Although the rule is recognized by Stansbury and decisions
subsequent to Suiinmerlin [see, e.g., Stathopoulos v. Shook, 251 N.C. 33,
110 S.E.2d 452 (1959) (recognized the rule but held improper response to
be non-prejudicial error); Patrick v. Treadwell, 222 N.C. 1, 21 S.E.2d 818
(1942) ("I know the accident did it" held error); J. M. Pace Mule Co. v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 160 N.C. 252, 75 S.E. 994 (1912) ("mule was
jammed up in the car" held error)], there are more exceptions than cases
that follow the rule. See, e.g., Hargett v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.,
258 N.C. 10, 128 S.E.2d 26 (1962) ("death resulted from insect sting"
was not considered by the court in relation to the rule); Stathopoulos v.
Shook, supra; Dempster v. Fite, 203 N.C. 697, 167 S.E. 33 (1932) ("the
accident caused the injury" held not prejudicial error) ; Martin v. P. H.
Hanes Knitting Co., 189 N.C. 644, 127 S.E. 688 (1925) (testimony as to
what caused death was not invasion of province of the jury); Lynch v.
Rosemary Mfg. Co., 167 N.C. 98, 83 S.E. 6 (1914) ("was cause of death"
not error); Parrish v. High Point, Randleman, Ashboro & Southern Ry.,
146 N.C. 125, 59 S.E. 348 (1907) ("the kidney was dislocated by the
fall" held proper response to a properly framed hypothetical question).
Parrish indicates the major withdrawal from a strict application of the
Sunzmerlin rule, and it appears that except for Patrick v. Treadwell, supra,
the rule gets no more than lip service from the court. The vitality of the
rule appears to come from Stansbury's warning and the tendency of attorneys to take the safe approach. The court is loathe to hold a violation
of the rule to be reversible error, yet it has not specifically overruled it.
' See Patrick v. Treadwell, 222 N.C. 1, 21 S.E.2d 818 (1942); 3. M.
Pace Mule Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 160 N.C. 252, 75 S.E. 994
(1912); Summerlin v. Carolina & Northwestern R.R., 133 N.C. 550,
45 S.E. 898 (1903); STANS1BURY §§ 126, 135.
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In Lockwood the plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision with the defendant. Negligence was admitted. There was
no denial that the plaintiff sustained injuries to his hip and neck
and had suffered severe headaches as a result. The controversy was
whether the causation between the accident and an attack of amnesia three months after the accident was established. A jury
verdict for 5,000 dollars was affirmed on appeal. 5
The direct testimony on the matter of causation indicated that
after the accident the plaintiff suffered various pains and severe
headaches and that he worried about the effect of his absence from
his service station, thereby losing sleep. During his absence, one
of his employees damaged a customer's automobile, and the plaintiff
had to pay 1,200 dollars damages. Several days after he returned
to work, he had a severe headache which was followed by the
amnesia. He was hospitalized and put under the care of a psychiatrist. It was the psychiatrist's expert testimony that was in question. After qualifying as an expert, he testified in response to a
hypothetical question, which the court found acceptable, that, "it
[the accident] may have had an influence on his condition."6 He
further testified:
I feel like there were other contributing factors. .

.

.basically

this man is an insecure person. He is a perfectionist. They
worry more-a worrisome individual. The accident was a
threat to his security, as well as the precipitating one is the loss
of the automobile some several days before at which time his
security was threatened and this is a factor.
These are precipitating factors in an insecure indevidual. 7
On cross-examination he stated:
This employee's . . .wrecking a car,

. .

.that financial burden,

yes, seems to be one of the factors. I thought that was the precipitating factor. He... had an insecure feeling which, of course,
existed long before this accident ....

If he had been a normal

person, this collision which resulted in some back pain, would
not have brought on amnesia."
Several interesting issues are raised by this case. The issue of proximate

cause is discussed in Byrd and Dobbs, Torts, Survey of N.C. Case Law, 43

N.C.L. RFv. 906 (1965); Note, 43 N.C.L. REv. 1011 (1965). Sufficiency of
the evidence to prove a prima facie case where expert medical testimony is
involved is discussed in Annot., 135 A.L.R. 516 (1941). See also 20 Am.
JuR. Evidence §§ 795, 862, 863 (1939).
o 262 N.C. at 666, 138 S.E.2d at 543.
7Ibid.
aIbid.
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On objection to the admission of the psychiatrist's testimony
as being insufficient to support a judgment and therefore inadmissible,' the court said that the testimony taken as a whole indicated a
reasonable scientific probability that the plaintiff's amnesia was produced as a direct result of the injuries suffered in the accident.1"
However, of the psychiatrist's testimony that "it may have had an
influence on his condition,"' 1 the court said: "This statement, considered alone, does not indicate a reasonable scientific probability
that the attack of amnesia resulted from plaintiff's physical injuries.
In this view of the matter the evidence is not admissible." 2 Herein
lies the significance of the case as it relates to rules of admissibility
of evidence.
It appears that the court is imposing rules of sufficiency on
rules of admissibility.' 3 It is submitted that the evidence was
clearly admissible as expert testimony, and the proper consideration
of the court should have been to support a finding of the fact of
causation by the jury. Instead, the court seems to have created a
4
new restriction on admissibility of expert testimony.'
I.

SUFFICIENCY AND ADMISSIBILITY

The great weight of authority indicates that expert opinion
evidence framed in terms of could or might is admissible." North
' Part of the purpose of this note is to indicate that the fact that expert
testimony is in itself insufficient to support a judgment for the proponent
should not make that testimony inadmissible.
10 262 N.C. at 669-70, 138 S.E.2d at 546.
1
Id. at 666, 138 S.E.2d at 543.
1
Id. at 669, 138 S.E.2d at 546. (Emphasis added.)
" "The 'could' or 'might' as used by Stansbury refers to probability and
not mere possibility." 262 N.C. at 668, 138 S.E.2d at 545. "If it is not
reasonably probable, as a scientific fact, that a particular effect is capable of
production by a given cause, and the witness so indicates, the evidence is
not sufficient to establish prima facie the causal relation, and if the testimony is offered by the party having the burden of showing the causal relation, the testimony, upon objection, should not be admitted, and, if admitted,
should be stricken." Id. at 669, 138 S.E.2d at 545-46. These indicate that
the court was talking in terms of admissibility, and was defining the couldor-might rule, which is clearly a rule of admissibility. See STANSnURY §
137.
1 This restriction may be stated that expert medical testimony must
not only conform to the could-or-might rule to be admissible, but must also
indicate a reasonable probability of the causal relationship. It is not known
whether the judge may consider other prior testimony, or whether he must
look1 only to the testimony given by the expert in making his ruling.
E.g., Birmingham Electric Co. v. Farmer, 251 Ala. 148, 36 So. 2d 343
(1948) ("probably due"); Ketcham v. Thomas, 283 S.W.2d 642 (Mo.
1955) ("could"); Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.
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Carolina has followed this rule in recent cases.' It does not seem
that the question of reasonable probability has arisen in relation to
admissibility. The general rule indicated by the court has been
applied in relation to sufficiency.17 Whether or not the evidence is
in itself sufficient to support a finding of causation by the jury
should not determine the admissibility of the evidence offered. The
West Virginia court has held that it "was not error to permit...
[a doctor] to testify as to the 'possible' causal relationship between
the plaintiff's condition at the time he treated her and the alleged
drinking of a coca-cola with particles of glass in it, but that evidence,
standing alone, was not sufficient to establish such a relationship."' 8
It is necessary that there be some form of reasonable probability
rule. It is accepted that there is some minimum standard of sufficiency when expert testimony is used, and this is defined in different
App. 1945) ("might be attributable"); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.
Kelly, 194 Okla. 646, 153 P.2d 1010 (1944) ("could"). See Annot., 66
A.L.R.2d 1082, 1118-26 (1959); Annot., 136 A.L.R. 965, 990-95 (1942).
But see Brandt v. Mansfield Rapid Transit, Inc., 153 Ohio St. 429, 41 Ohio
Op. 428, 92 N.E.2d 1 (1950); Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1082, 1124-26 (1959);
Annot., 136 A.L.R. 965, 994-95 (1942). "It seems universally agreed that
an expert medical opinion as to the cause of death, disease, or other physical
condition is inadmissible if it is solely an unsupported conclusion of the
witness, since however well qualified the witness is, and however scientific
or abstruse the subject matter is, an opinion must have reference to the material facts of the case as reflected by the evidence." Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d
1082, 1086 (1959). It is doubtful that the court in Lockwood was considering
the psychiatrist's testimony as being merely speculative when the ruling on
admissibility was made.
"0Reason v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 259 N.C. 264, 130 S.E.2d 397
(1963) (evidence apparently admissible, but not sufficient to support a
verdict); Bullin v. Moore, 256 N.C. 82, 122 S.E.2d 765 (1961) ("I think
it is possible to attribute"); Ford v. Blythe Bros. Co., 242 N.C. 347, 87
S.E.2d 879 (1955) ("might or might not").
17 See Annot., 135 A.L.R. 516 (1941).
In Lockwood the court referred
to this annotation and summarized its contents thusly:
(1) It appears to be well settled that expert medical testimony that a
given accident or injury possibly caused a subsequent impaired physical
or mental condition-indicating mere possibility or chance of existence
of the causal relation-is not sufficient to establish such relation .... (2)

There is a division of opinion as to whether expert medical testimony
of the probability of such causal relation is sufficient. .

.

. (3)

There

are a number of cases, however, which have held that expert medical
testimony of possibility of such causal relation, in conjunction with
non-expert testimony indicating that such relation exists (although not
sufficient by itself to establish the relation), is sufficient to establish the
causal relation.
262 N.C. at 666, 138 S.E.2d at 544. This would indicate that the court
was aware that it was superimposing a rule of sufficiency upon the rule of
admissibility,
or at least that it was dealing with sufficiency.
"0 Rutherford v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 142 W.Va. 681,
692, 97 S.E.2d 803, 809 (1957).
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jurisdictions in varying terms.'" Apparently the great majority of
courts hold that mere scientific possibility of an event causing a
particular result is not sufficient to prove the prima facie fact of
causation.2" This note makes no attempt to indicate what is North
Carolina's rule as to minimum sufficiency, but Lockwood has said
21
that the statement, "it may have had an influence on his condition,"
is not sufficient. This is reasonable, but now the question arises
whether or not the use of the words could or might would be
sufficient. It is difficult to see any logical distinction between may
and could or might. Assuming that the court does not try to make
this distinction and gives the same effect to could or might as it does
to may, North Carolina does have a somewhat ill-defined rule of
minimum sufficiency where expert testimony on causation is offered.
Why has this rule of sufficiency been superimposed on a rule of
admissibility? For the sake of orderly procedure, the court should
adopt an admissibility rule that will permit testimony in terms of
could or might and restrict the consideration of reasonable probability for a motion of nonsuit. Nevertheless, the court has said that
evidence may not be admissible unless it shows reasonable probability.
II.

COULD-OR-MIGHT

RULE AND REASONABLE

PROBABILITY REQUIREMENT

The Lockwood decision brought into clear relief the anomaly
that exists between the could-or-might rule and the reasonable
probability requirement. Whether or not the reasonable probability
rule be considered a rule of admissibility or one of sufficiency as it
relates to causation, it seems that what is required for admissibility
may cast doubt on the sufficiency of that evidence.2 3 In short, what
See Annot., 135 A.L.R. 516 (1941); 20 Amf. JUR. Evidence § 795
(1939); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 569 (4) b (1964). Without this standard
of minimum sufficiency, testimony that expresses any possibility at all
would be allowed to go to the jury. For policy reasons there is this
realm, usually described as mere scientific possibility, that will not support a verdict for the plaintiff. This writer makes no guess as to when
"mere scientific possibility" becomes "reasonable probability." Lockwood
does not appear to be very illuminating on this point, and it would be
dangerous
to depend on the facts of that case as a guide.
20 See notes 17 & 19 supra.
21262 N.C. at 666, 138 S.E.2d at 543. (Emphasis added.)
22 See notes 17 & 19 supra.
2" By requiring that expert testimony be couched in terms of could or
might or probable, the evidence automatically becomes suspect under the
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is required to get by the could-or-might rule certainly brings the
testimony into the realm where it may be discredited by the reasonable probability rule. It is obvious from the history of the couldor-might rule that it was intended to restrict expert opinion testimony on causation to the possibility or probability of the event's
occurring, and the expert's opinion is directed to the scientific possi24
bility rather than his personal opinion of causation in fact. Sup-

posedly the expert is to go no further because an opinion as to
causation in fact is an invasion of the province of the jury.25 It
is also clear that the rule has not had this effect, and doctors, or
other experts, are allowed to give their opinion as to causation in
fact in terms, less positive than would or did, that the attorneys
think will not run afoul of the rule.2" This has resulted in a situation where courts do allow opinion evidence as to the ultimate fact
of causation; but because attorneys are afraid of the could-or-might
rule, a witness is told to couch his testimony in less positive terms,
even though in his expert opinion there is no doubt of the causal
connection. It is submitted that the could-or-might rule has not
had the effect of limiting the scope of expert testimony to the scientific probability of causation, but it does have the effect of preventing the jury from hearing the best testimony available, i.e.,
the precise conviction of the expert as to the fact of causation.
If the policy that the North Carolina court wishes to follow is
to prevent opinion testimony on causation in fact, a more adequate
rule should be adopted than the could-or-might rule. If the court
does not wish to prevent opinion testimony on causation, then the
could-or-might rule should be abolished altogether. By giving his
reasonable probability rule. There is obviously an area in which the testi-

mony may be in terms of could or might and show a reasonable scientific
probability, but the attorney must be aware that he has both an "upper"
and a "lower" limit on the expert opinion testimony that is admissible.
He must be careful to negotiate between these two limits. The lower limit
of the requirement of reasonable probability as a condition of admissibility
was not present prior to Lockwood, but by dictum in that case, it suddenly
appeared.
24 See Summerlin v. Carolina & Northwestern R.R., 133 N.C. 550, 45
S.E. 898 (1903); STAKSBURY, §§ 126, 137.
" See note 24 supra.
28 See, e.g., Hargett v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 10,
128 S.E.2d 26 (1962); Martin v. P. H. Hanes Knitting Co., 189 N.C. 644,
127 S.E. 688 (1925); Moore v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance
Corp., 173 N.C. 532, 92 S.E. 362 (1917); Lynch v. Rosemary Mfg. Co.,
167 N.C. 98, 83 S.E. 6 (1914); Jones v. Warehouse Co., 137 N.C. 337,
49 S.E. 355 (1904).
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opinion as to causation, the expert is clearly invading the province
of the jury. It is submitted that this is the proper place for "invasion" and if expert testimony is given, it should be given in the
language that best describes the opinion, but not in some language
that merely allows the testimony to get by an objection based on
an outmoded rule of admissibility. The invasion is allowed in the
case of an expert because he possesses knowledge and skill above
that of the jury." This skill and knowledge is highly useful for
the jury in making an accurate determination of the issue before
them. If the expert's opinion will assist in making a more accurate
determination, it should be admitted.28 In a situation where an expert
has testified only to the scientific possibility of a result following an
event, is the jury able to do more than guess whether there was in
fact causation? If, however, he continues his testimony and states,
in response to a proper hypothetical question, that in his opinion
the result was caused by the event, this being based on his expert
knowledge, is the jury not better equipped to decide more accurately
the matter before them? It is submitted that on the issue of causation as well as in other areas of expert testimony, the doctor should
be allowed to give his opinion, and give it in any terms that accurately describe the opinion. In a forceful attack upon the couldor-might rule, the Iowa court said:
There is no sound basis in law, reason, or common sense for
decisions that a witness may state his opinion as to what "may,"
"might," "could," or "probably did," cause something, but may

not give an opinion as to what "did," "will," or "would," cause
it. The true rule is, and should be, that the witness may use such
expression as voices his true state of mind on the matter,
whether it be possibility, probability, or actuality. To insist that

a witness confine his testimony to an expression of possibility
or probability, when his real judgment or conviction is actuality,
or fact, is unfair, to the witness and the jury, and unjust to the

party offering the testimony.20

" See, e.g., Seawell v. Brane, 258 N.C. 666, 129 S.E.2d 283 (1963);
Tyndall v. Hines Co., 226 N.C. 620, 39 S.E.2d 828 (1946); Patrick v.
Treadwell, 222 N.C. 1, 21 S.E.2d 818 (1942); Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C.
530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936); STANSURY, §§ 132, 134, 135.
2 See note 27 supra.
' Grismore v. Consolidated Prod. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 348, 5 N.W.2d
646, 657 (1942). This case has a good discussion attacking the rationale
of invasion of the province of the jury. See id. at 342-48, 5 N.W.2d at 65455. It also contains an extensive attack on the could-or-might rule. See id.
at 348-60, 5 N.W.2d at 657-663.
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III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the light of the could-or-might rule and the Lockwood decision, it appears that an attorney should carefully coach his
expert witness so that he will express in the strongest possible terms
short of certainty the fact of causation. It would be wise first to
ask the doctor if the result in question is a scientific possibility. The
favorable and acceptable answer would be that it happens in a high
number of instances and the likelihood of such a causal connection
is great. The attorney would then ask the doctor's opinion as to
the existence of a causal connection on the facts of the case. Again
the favorable and acceptable answer would be that in his opinion, in
this case, it was very probable that the event did cause the injury.
This clearly indicates more than a mere possibility.
It is possible that with the growing disfavor of the could-ormight rule, an attorney may violate it, raise it squarely on appeal,
and have it overruled. It is also possible that a properly framed
hypothetical question and answer may fall within an exception."
Either course has its obvious risks. An attorney must be aware of
the problems that now have come to light as a result of Lockwood.
In a situation where an expert is necessary to establish causation, the
attorney must proceed with caution and take the safest course allowed by the facts of his case, with a full realization of the unsettled and ill-defined rules that exist.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the correct view of the law is that consideration of whether reasonable probability is shown by the expert
is to be considered on a motion for nonsuit and not on objection to
testimony and a motion to strike. This view would mean that all
relevant testimony-not merely the isolated testimony of the expert-is to be considered to determine sufficiency if there is other
evidence of causation. It is also strongly urged that the could-ormight rule, as it is applied, be abolished so that expert opinion
testimony be allowed in the terms that best describe the opinion of
80 See Parrish v. High Point, Randleman, Ashboro & Southern Ry., 146
N.C. 125, 59 S.E. 348 (1907). In Parrishthe court distinguished Summerlin
to its own satisfaction. Stansbury finds the distinction a narrow one. See
note 3 supra. For variations of the Parrishexception, see cases cited in note
3 supra.
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the expert. If, on the other hand, the court wishes to retain the
notion that expert witnesses be restricted to giving opinion testimony
only of scientific possibilities, a different test must be fashioned.
WILLIAM H. CANNON
Federal Jurisdiction-Non-Federal Ground Rule
The petitioner in Henry v. Mississippi' was convicted of disorderly conduct. The conviction was based on corroborating evidence
which was admittedly obtained by unlawful means and in violation
of the state constitution.' This evidence constituted an essential
ingredient of the state's case, without which the petitioner could
not have been connected with the crime. At the trial, counsel for
the petitioner failed to object to the introduction of the corroborating evidence,- but a motion for a directed verdict was made at the
close of the state's case, which among other things specified that the
evidence had been illegally obtained.4 This motion was renewed at
the close of all the evidence." Petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi where the decision was initially reversed and
the case remanded for a new trial.' The court emphasized the plight
of out-of-state counsel unfamiliar with the procedural requirement
that the objection to illegally seized evidence must be made at the
time it is introduced.7 After the first opinion, the state filed a
Suggestion of Error which pointed out that the petitioner had in
fact been represented by competent local counsel. The Mississippi
Supreme Court then withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.' The court stated that honest mistakes
of counsel in respect to policy or strategy "are binding upon the
client as a part of the hazards of courtroom battle."'
-379 U.S. 443 (1965).

'Henry v. State, 154 So. 2d 289, 294 (Miss. 1963).
'Furthermore, the officer who was responsible for obtaining the evidence
was cross-examined concerning certain facts relating to its seizure. Ibid.
'For the text of the motion of a directed verdict, see Henry v. Missis-

sippi, 379 U.S. 443, 459-60 (1965)

(Harlan, J., dissenting).

Id. at 445.

e This opinion appeared in the Southern Reporter advance sheets at
154 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1963). For a criticism of the decision, see 35 Miss.
L.J. 109 (1963).
Henry v. State, supra note 6,at 296.
'This opinion appears in the bound volume of the Southern Reporter;
the volume and page number are the same as that of the first opinion. See
note 6 supra.

'Henry v. State, 154 So. 2d 289, 296 (Miss. 1963) (bound volume).

